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The ultimate aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is improving the transmission distance
and key generation speed. Unfortunately, it is believed to be limited by the secret-key ca-
pacity of quantum channel without quantum repeater. Recently, a novel twin-field QKD
(TF-QKD) is proposed to break through the limit, where the key rate is proportional to the
square-root of channel transmittance. Here, by using the vacuum and one-photon state as
a qubit, we show that the TF-QKD can be regarded as a measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) with single-photon Bell state measurement. Therefore, the MDI property
of TF-QKD can be understood clearly. Importantly, the universal security proof theories
can be directly used for TF-QKD, such as BB84 encoding, six-state encoding and reference-
frame-independent scheme. Furthermore, we propose a feasible experimental scheme for the
proof-of-principle experimental demonstration.
Throughout history, the battle between encryption and decryption never ends. Currently, re-
lying on computational complexity, the widely used public-key cryptosystem becomes vulnerable
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to quantum computing attacks. The one-time pad is the only provably secure cryptosystem ac-
cording to information theory known today. Thereinto, an important issue exists that the common
secret key is at least as long as the message itself and can be used only once. Quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) constitutes the only way to solve the real time key distribution problem1. QKD
allows two distant parties to establish a string of secret keys with information-theoretic security2, 3.
One can ensure legitimate parties to exchange messages with perfect confidentiality by combining
QKD with one-time pad.
The longest transmission distance of QKD has been implemented over 421 km with ultralow-
loss optical fiber4 and 1200 km satellite-to-ground5. Improving the transmission distance and key
rate are the most important tasks of QKD research. However, this task has been proven impos-
sible beyond a certain limit without quantum repeaters6, 7. The secret-key capacity of quantum
channel can be used to bound the extractable maximum secret key6, 7. Generally, the secret-key ca-
pacity can be regarded as a linear key rate Pirandola-Laurenza-Ottaviani-Banchi (PLOB) bound7
RPLOB = − log2(1 − η), where η is the transmittance. To overcome the rate-distance limit of
QKD, quantum repeaters are usually believed as a strong candidate8, 9. However, the long-time
quantum memory and high-fidelity entanglement distillation are far from feasible. Despite the re-
cent advance10 relaxing the requirement, the actual implementation is also difficult to realize, for
example, quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement. Although the trusted relay-based QKD
has been deployed over 2000 km11, its security is compromised.
Recently, a novel protocol called twin-field QKD (TF-QKD)12 has been proposed to over-
come the rate-distance limit. The secret key rate of TF-QKD has been scaled with the square-root
of the transmittance, R ∼ O(√η). In the TF-QKD, a pair of optical fields are generated re-
spectively at locations of two remote parties and then sent to the untrusted center to implement
single-photon detection. Compared with measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)13,
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TF-QKD retains the properties of being immune to all detector attack, multiplexing of expensive
single-photon detectors and natural star network architecture. In the original paper of TF-QKD12,
the communication parties, Alice and Bob, prepare the phase-randomized coherent state with phase
encoding in X and Y basis. To acquire the correction of raw keys, they should announce the ran-
dom phase of each pulse. The key rate of unconditional security proof is still missing in the
original paper12. Various different important works have been shown to give the key rate formulas
with information-theoretic security14–19.
Here, we prove that TF-QKD can be seen as a special type of MDI-QKD. Thereinto, a qubit
is physically implemented by a two-dimensional subspace with vacuum and one-photon state. One
can consider that the untrusted center performs the single-photon Bell state measurement (BSM)
while Alice and Bob prepare quantum state in the complementary bases. Since the vacuum state
is immune to the loss, it can always have a detection (detector without click means a successful
detection), thus the probability of coincident detection is exactly equal to that of single detection.
Therefore, the TF-QKD inherits all positive features of MDI-QKD and increases the key rate a lot
to break through the linear key rate bound. The unconditional security proof technologies with
entanglement purification20, 21, information theory analysis22, entropy uncertainty relation23 can be
directly applied in the TF-QKD. The bit of Z basis is independent of the phase misalignment.
Naturally, there is no need to publish random phase of Z basis and the state can be seen as a
mixture of photon number states. Therefore, the distilled secret key of Z basis in the TF-QKD can
exploit the tagging-method of Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) analysis24. Combining
the decoy-state method25–27, we could acquire the tight key rate formula of TF-QKD with BB84
encoding1, six-state encoding28 and reference-frame-independent (RFI)29 scheme .
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Results
MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM. Here, let us first introduce an entanglement-based MDI-
QKD with single-photon BSM protocol, as shown in Fig. 1(a). Let {|0〉 , |1〉} represent Z basis,
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the vacuum and the one-photon state, respectively. Accordingly, the eigen-
vectors ofX basis and Y basis are |±〉 = (|0〉±|1〉)/√2 and |±i〉 = (|0〉±i |1〉)/√2. Considering
that one photon inputs a lossless symmetric beam splitter, the output state is a single-photon en-
tangled state, |ψ+〉 = (|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉)/√2. Alice and Bob prepare a series of entangled states
|ψ+〉Aa = (|0〉A |1〉a+|1〉A |0〉a)/
√
2 and |ψ+〉Bb = (|0〉B |1〉b+|1〉B |0〉b)/
√
2, respectively, where
A (B) and a (b) are a pair of field modes. Afterwards, they hold the qubit of a and b modes and
send the quantum states of A and B modes to the untrusted third party, Charlie, who performs
the BSM to identify the two single-photon Bell states |ψ+〉AB = (|0〉A |1〉B + |1〉A |0〉B)/
√
2 and
|ψ−〉AB = (|0〉A |1〉B − |1〉A |0〉B)/
√
2. Therefore, a coincidence detection with L click and R no
click indicates a projection into the Bell state |ψ+〉AB. A coincidence detection with R click and
L no click, implies a projection into the Bell state |ψ−〉AB . Note that the identification of any one
Bell state is enough to prove the security. When Charlie performs a successful BSM, the qubit that
the legitimate users hold becomes a single-photon Bell state, the process of which can be regarded
as an entanglement swapping, as experimentally demonstrated30. Alice and Bob can utilize quan-
tum memory to store their qubit a and b modes. After Charlie announces the events through public
channels whether he has obtained a Bell state and which Bell state he has identified, Alice and
Bob will measure qubit a and b modes, respectively. They publish the basis information through
an authenticated classical channel. Bob will apply a bit flip when they choose Z (X or Y ) basis
and Charlie receives a Bell state |ψ±〉AB (|ψ−〉AB). They use the data of Z basis to form the raw
key, while the data of other bases are all used to estimate the leaked information. Alice and Bob
can acquire the secure key through the error correction and privacy amplification.
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We can equivalently convert our entanglement-based protocol in Fig. 1(a) to the prepare-
and-measure protocol as shown in Fig. 1(b) by the Shor-Preskill’s arguments21. Let Alice and
Bob measure the modes a and b before they send the qubit of A and B modes to Charlie, meaning
Alice and Bob directly prepare the quantum stateA mode and B mode. Other steps are all same to
the entanglement-based protocol, including the BSM, basis comparison, bit flip, error correction
and privacy amplification. Hereafter, we use the TF state to represent the joint quantum state
of Alice’s A mode and Bob’s B mode. In the case of ideal detector (photon-number-resolving
and without dark count) and lossless channel, the MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM protocol is
similar with the two-photon BSM protocol. However, the single-photon BSM exploits the vacuum
state identification, namely, detector without click, the case of TF state with |1〉A |1〉B will create
error Bell state detection under the case of lossy channel, which will cause the unbalanced bit value
and high bit error rate.
To solve this issue, Alice and Bob need to decrease the probability of qubit |1〉 prepara-
tion and increase the probability of qubit |0〉 preparation. Therefore, Alice (Bob) should exploit
the entangled state |ψ〉t =
√
1− t |0〉 |1〉 + √t |1〉 |0〉 to replace the maximally entangled state
|ψ+〉 = (|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉)/√2 in the entanglement-based protocol with Fig. 1(a), where t is the
transmittance of partial BS. Note that the non-maximally entangled state is also used to prove the
security in the TF-QKD18. Taking into account the threshold detector and lossy channel, the joint
quantum state of Alice’s a mode and Bob’s b mode after Charlie’s BSM with |ψ±〉AB under the
case without eavesdropper’s disturbance can be written as (see Methods for detail)
ρ±ab =
q0
q
|11〉ab 〈11|+
q1
q
|ψ±〉ab 〈ψ±|+
q2
q
|00〉ab 〈00| , (1)
where q = q0+q1+q2, q0, q1 and q2 are the probabilities of Charlie’s successful BSM given that the
photon numbers of TF state are zero, one and two. Consider a virtual step, if Alice and Bob jointly
perform QND measurement on TF state to implement photon-number-resolving before they send
TF state to Charlie, the joint quantum state of Alice’s a mode and Bob’s b mode is |ψ±〉ab given
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that the TF state with one-photon and Charlie’s BSM with |ψ±〉AB , which reduces to the the case
of ideal detector and lossless channel.
Similarly, we can have a equivalent prepare-and-measure protocol corresponding to the
entanglement-based protocol with entangled state |ψ〉t =
√
1− t |0〉 |1〉 +√t |1〉 |0〉. Alice (Bob)
prepares the qubit |+z〉 = |0〉 and |−z〉 = |1〉 with probability 1 − t and t as Z basis logic bit
0 and 1, respectively. Alice (Bob) prepares the qubit |+x〉 = √1− t |0〉 + √t |1〉 and |−x〉 =
√
1− t |0〉 − √t |1〉 with equal probability as X basis logic bit 0 and 1, respectively. Alice (Bob)
prepares the qubit |+y〉 = √1− t |0〉+ i√t |1〉 and |−y〉 = √1− t |0〉 − i√t |1〉 with equal prob-
ability as Y basis logic bit 0 and 1, respectively. Obviously, the quantum state can be seen as a
mixture of photon number states for TF state in the Z basis. For the TF state with one-photon in
the Z basis, one of Alice and Bob needs to prepare |0〉 as logic bit 0 and the other prepare |1〉 as
logic bit 1. However, the quantum state is coherent superposition of photon number states for TF
state in the X (Y ) basis. Here, if we assume Alice and Bob knowing the quantum bit error rate
(QBER) of TF state with one-photon in theX basis, for example, Alice and Bob can perform joint
QND measurement on TF state to implement photon-number-resolving in theX basis, one can use
the case of TF state with one-photon to extract secure key in the BB84 encoding, which can be
given by (see Methods for detail)
RBB84 = q1[1−H(eb1XX)]− qH(EZZ), (2)
where EZZ = (q0 + q2)/q is the QBER of Z basis, H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is
the binary Shannon entropy and eb1XX is the QBER in X basis for TF state with one-photon. We
can have optimal secure key rate in Eq. (2) with the transmittance of partial BS t ≈ 8% given
that QBER eb1XX = 3%, dark count rate of threshold detector pd = 10
−6, efficiency of threshold
detector ηd = 40% and the fiber distance between Alice and Bob L ≥ 100 km. Note that the
entanglement-based protocol in Fig. 1(a) and prepare-and-measure protocol in Fig. 1(b) are the
virtual protocols, which are not used to perform experiment but prove the security in theory.
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TF-QKD with phase-encoding coherent state. Manipulating the quantum state with su-
perpositions of the vacuum and one-photon states and, in particular, requiring control about the
relative phase between the vacuum and one-photon state is quite problematic31. However, we
consider the coherent state |α〉 = e−µ/2∑∞n=0 (eiθ√µ)n√n! |n〉, where the relative phase θ between the
different Fock states in the superposition is reflected physically in the phase of the classical electric
field. Hereafter, the phase-encoding basis means to implement phase modulation of coherent state,
such as X and Y basis. In order to achieve Alice and Bob knowing the QBER of TF state with
one-photon in the phase-encoding basis without the requirement of QND measurement, one can
use the post-selected phase-matching method for phase-randomized coherent state12, 15. By using
the post-selected phase-matching method, the phases of Alice’s and Bob’s coherent state can be
seen as equal and randomized, which means that they can use decoy-state method to estimate the
yield and QBER of TF state with one-photon in the phase-encoding basis (see Methods).
Efficient TF-QKD. Here, we propose an efficient TF-QKD that the single-photon source
used for Z basis and laser source used for phase-encoding basis in Fig. 1(c). The qubit prepared
in Z basis can be implemented by turning on and off (such as optical switch) the single-photon
source, while the qubit of phase encoding basis should exploit the phase-randomized coherent state
combined with phase modulation. However, the perfect single-photon source is still a challenge
under the current technology. Therefore, we propose a practical TF-QKD by exploiting phase-
randomized coherent state to replace single-photon source used for Z basis encoding.
Practical TF-QKD. In the following, let us explain our practical TF-QKD in detail as shown
in Fig. 2(a). (i) Alice and Bob use the stabilized narrow line-width continuous-wave laser and
amplitude modulator to prepare the global phase stabilized optical pulses. Alice’s and Bob’s ran-
dom phases θA ∈ [0, 2pi) and θB ∈ [0, 2pi) are realized by using phase modulators. For Z basis
encoding, the phase-randomized coherent state with intensities 0 and µ as logic bits 0 and 1 with
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probabilities 1 − t and t by using amplitude modulator. For X (Y ) basis encoding, they use the
phase and amplitude modulator to randomly implement 0 (pi/2) and pi (−pi/2) phase modulation
as logic bits 0 and 1 with intensities {ν/2, ω/2, 0}. (ii) Then they send quantum states to Charlie
for single-photon BSM through the insecure quantum channel. Charlie publishes the successful
events of single-photon BSM. (iii) Alice and Bob will announce the basis information through
the authenticated classical channel. The intensity and random phase information kA,B of phase-
encoding basis should be disclosed, while those of Z basis are confidential to Charlie, where they
have θA,B ∈ ∆kA,B , ∆kA,B = [2pikA,BM ,
2pi(kA,B+1)
M
) and kA,B ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1}. (iv) Alice and
Bob use the data of Z basis as the raw key, while the data of phase-encoding basis are announced
to estimate the amount of leaked information. (v) They exploit the classical error correction and
privacy amplification to extract the secure key rate.
After Charlie announces the measurement results, he cannot change the yield and QBER
due to information causality32. The decoy-state method of estimating the yield and QBER of TF
state with n-photon in phase-encoding basis is also true even for the post-selected phase-matching
method, which has also been used in phase-matching QKD15. The GLLP analysis24 can be used
for the data of Z basis, since the random phases information of Alice’s and Bob’s coherent states
are all confidential to Charlie. Bob will always flit his bit in Z basis. Due to the density matrix of
TF state with one-photon ρ1ZZTF = ρ
1XX
TF =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01| + |10〉AB 〈10|), we can use the yield of
TF state with one-photon Y 1ZZTF = Y
1XX
TF in the asymptotic limit. Note that, we can also directly
estimate the yield Y 1ZZTF by using the data of phase-encoding basis given that one of Alice and Bob
sends intensity 0.
For the BB84 encoding1, Alice and Bob only keep the data of |kB − kA| = 0 and M/2
when they both choose X basis by the post-selected phase-matching method. If |kB − kA| = 0
(|kB − kA| =M/2), Bob will flit his bit when Charlie receives a Bell state |ψ−〉AB (|ψ+〉AB). The
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secure key rate of practical TF-QKD can be given by
RTF-BB84 = 2t(1− t)µe−µY 1ZZTF [1−H(eb1XX)]−QZZfH(EZZ), (3)
where QZZ is the gain in Z basis acquired directly from the experiment, f = 1.15 is the error
correction coefficient.
For the RFI scheme29, 33, one can allow Alice and Bob to have different phase references
which can be changed slowly (details can be found in Methods). Therefore, they can collect
the data of |kB − kA| = k, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,M − 1} to form a set Dk, where the probability of
|kB − kA| = k is 1M . For each set Dk, they calculate the value C1k = (1 − 2eb1XXk)2 + (1 −
2eb1XY k)
2 + (1− 2eb1Y Xk)2 + (1− 2eb1Y Y k)2, where eb1XXk(XY k,Y Xk,Y Y k) is the QBER of TF state with
one-photon in set Dk given that Alice and Bob chooseX −X(X − Y, Y −X, Y − Y ) basis. The
secure key rate of practical TF-QKD with RFI scheme can be given by
RTF-RIF =2t(1− t)µe−µY 1ZZTF [1− IE(C1)]−QZZfH(EZZ), (4)
where IE(C
1) = (1−eb1ZZ)H(1+µ2 )+eb1ZZH(1+v2 ) describes eavesdropper Eve’s information, there-
into, v =
√
C1/2− (1− eb1ZZ)2u2/eb1ZZ , u = min[
√
C1/2/(1 − eb1ZZ), 1] and C1 = 1M
∑M−1
k=0 C
1
k .
Compared with the BB84 encoding, all data of RFI scheme can be exploited to estimate parameter
C1, which can be used to slow down the finite size effect. Alice and Bob can changeM to acquire
the maximum key rate without impacts on efficiency. The QBER of Z basis for TF state with
one-photon eb1ZZ ≡ 0 leads to IE(C1) = H((1 +
√
C1/2)/2).
The secure key rate of practical TF-QKD using BB84 encoding changes with the dark count
rate as shown in Fig. 3. We use the practical parameters to simulate the secure key rate in Fig.
3, where the efficiency of detector is ηd = 40%, the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.2 dB/km
and the optical error rate of system is eopt = 1%. The optical error rate is usually large due to the
long-distance single-photon-type interference. We compare the secure key rates of practical TF-
QKD using BB84 encoding and RFI scheme with the different optical error rate as shown in Fig.
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4. To show the advantage of TF-QKD, the efficiency and dark count rate of detector are assumed
to be ηd = 90% and pd = 10
−9 in Fig. 4, respectively. In the simulation, both schemes can surpass
the PLOB bound and tolerate the big optical error rate eopt. The key rate of TF-QKD with BB84
encoding will significantly decline with eopt rising, while the RFI scheme is robust. However, the
long-distance phase-stabilization (it could not be a perfect match but is required to vary slowly)
also exists since the relative phase changes too fast in the long-distance fiber or free-space channel.
The experimental demonstration of TF-QKD with independent lasers in Fig. 2(a) is a big
challenge, although the MDI-QKD with two-photon BSM has been implemented over 404 km
optical fiber34 by using asymmetric four-intensity decoy-state method35. Compared with the two-
photon BSM, greater technological challenges exist in the TF-QKD with single-photon BSM.
The frequency difference of two independent lasers is required more rigorously12. The phase-
locking technique may be used to compensate the frequency difference. Importantly, the long-
distance phase-stabilization technique is required to implement single-photon interference with
phase matching. The RFI scheme can allow the phase mismatching. However, the relative phase
change is still required to vary slowly. To rapidly implement the proof-of-principle TF-QKD ex-
periment, we present a phase self-aligned TF-QKD with single laser interference as shown in Fig.
2(b). The horizontal polarization optical pulse generated by Charlie is divided into two pulses by
the polarization-maintaining beam splitter. By exploiting the pi/2 rotation effect of Faraday mir-
ror, the two pulses interfere after they go through the same path. Though the phase self-aligned
scheme would be affected by the loss and noise, the frequency difference and long-distance phase-
stabilization problems are both solved36. An extra security analysis with untrusted source37 should
be used to defeat the attack from systems of Alice and Bob.
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Discussion
In summary, we have proved that the TF-QKD can be regarded as a MDI-QKD with single-photon
BSM. By introducing the Z basis encoding, the secret key extraction can exploit the tagging
method of GLLP analysis and the decoy-state method. Compared with BB84 encoding, the RFI
scheme has the advantages of increasing the data of parameter estimation and reducing the effect
of phase drift. We should point out that the extra Y basis preparation in RFI scheme does not add
additional operation due to the active phase randomization requirement, which is different from the
traditional QKD. We propose a feasible experimental scheme to implement the proof-of-principle
experimental demonstration. Note that, the security of this proof-of-principle experiment in Fig.
2b is not guaranteed with our current analysis, which requires a further security evaluation due to
introducing untrusted source. Through simulation, we show that the secure key rate of practical
TF-QKD can surpass the PLOB bound. The universally composable security with finite-key anal-
ysis needs to be considered in the future. Our proposal suggests an important avenue for practical
high-speed and long-distance QKD without detector vulnerabilities. During the preparation of this
paper and posting it on the arXiv, we became aware of some important works14–19 of TF-QKD.
Methods
MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM. For the case of entanglement-based protocol with the en-
tangled state |ψ〉t =
√
1− t |0〉 |1〉 + √t |1〉 |0〉, the joint quantum state of Alice and Bob can be
given by
|ϕ〉ABab = |ψ+〉Aa ⊗ |ψ+〉Bb
= (1− t) |0011〉ABab +
√
t(1− t) (|0110〉ABab + |1001〉ABab) + t |1100〉ABab .
(5)
For the threshold detector and lossy channel, the TF state |00〉AB , |01〉AB, |10〉AB and |11〉AB will
all have single-photon Bell state clicks. Due to the single-photon BSM of Charlie, the photon
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number of TF state will collapse to three events, namely vacuum, one-photon and two-photon.
The corresponding probability can be expressed as
q0 = 2(1− t)2pd(1− pd),
q1 = 2t(1− t) {pd(1− pd)(1−√η) + (1− pd)[1− (1− pd)(1−√η)]} ,
q2 = t
2
{
pd(1− pd)(1−√η)2 + (1− pd)[1− (1− pd)(1−√η)2]
}
,
(6)
where the expression of q2 is acquired by the Hong-Ou-Mandel interference of two-photon. The
parameter
√
η = ηd × 10−0.02L/2 is the transmittance between Alice (Bob) and Charlie.
For the case of prepare-and-measure protocol corresponding to entanglement-based protocol
with the entangled state |ψ〉t =
√
1− t |0〉 |1〉+√t |1〉 |0〉, the density matrix of TF state in the Z
basis is
ρZZTF = t(1− t)(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|) + (1− t)2 |00〉AB 〈00|+ t2 |11〉AB 〈11| , (7)
which means a mixture of photon number states for TF state in the Z basis. The TF state of Z
basis is the product state of Alice’s and Bob’s quantum state. The density matrix of TF state with
one-photon in the Z basis is
ρ1ZZTF =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|), (8)
which needs one of Alice and Bob prepares |0〉 as logic bit 0 and the other prepares |1〉 as logic bit
1.
The density matrix of TF state in theX basis can be written as
ρXXTF =
1
4
[ |+x,+x〉AB 〈+x,+x|+ |+x,−x〉AB 〈+x,−x|
+ |−x,+x〉AB 〈−x,+x|+ |−x,−x〉AB 〈−x,−x|
]
.
(9)
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Thereinto, we have
|±x,+x〉AB = (1− t) |00〉AB +
√
t(1 − t)(|01〉AB ± |10〉AB)± t |11〉AB ,
|±x,−x〉AB = (1− t) |00〉AB −
√
t(1− t)(|01〉AB ∓ |10〉AB)∓ t |11〉AB ,
(10)
which means a coherent superposition of photon number state for TF state in theX basis. If Alice
and Bob jointly perform QND measurement on TF state to implement photon-number-resolving,
we have
|±x,+x〉AB
QND measurement
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGA
one-photon
1√
2
(|01〉AB ± |10〉AB),
|±x,−x〉AB
QND measurement
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGA
one-photon
1√
2
(|01〉AB ∓ |10〉AB),
ρ1XXTF =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|) = ρ1ZTF ,
(11)
where ρ1ZZTF (ρ
1XX
TF ) is the density matrix of TF state with one-photon in the Z (X) basis. We have
Y 1ZZTF = Y
1XX
TF in the asymptotic limit due to ρ
1ZZ
TF = ρ
1XX
TF , where Y
1ZZ
TF (Y
1XX
TF ) is the yield
given that Alice and Bob choose Z (X) basis and TF state contains one-photon. Alice and Bob can
know the locations of the TF state with one-photon by using the QND measurement, they could
discard all other states and apply error correction and privacy amplification only to the TF state
with one-photon. In this case with BB84 encoding, they can achieve a key rate of20, 21
RBB84 = q1[1−H(eb1ZZ)−H(eb1XX)]). (12)
For the TF state with one-photon in the Z basis, we have eb1ZZ ≡ 0 since we only have the case of
Alice’s logic bit 0 (1) and Bob’s logic bit 1 (0) corresponding to quantum state |01〉 (|10〉).
However, if we assume that Alice and Bob can know the QBER of TF state with one-photon
in the X basis, one can acquire the secure key in the Z basis without Alice and Bob knowing the
locations (QND measurement) of the TF state with one-photon by using the GLLP analysis24. The
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secure key rate can be given by
RBB84 = q1[1−H(eb1XX)]− qH(EZZ), (13)
where the parameter q1 should be calculated by using the decoy-state method, for example, we
choose three value of t in the Z basis.
TF-QKD with phase-encoding coherent state. In order to make Alice and Bob know the
QBER of TF state with one-photon in the X basis without the requirement of QND measurement,
we need to consider the case of phase-randomized coherent state
ρ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|α〉A 〈α| ⊗ |eiδα〉B 〈eiδα| dθ
= e−2µ
∞∑
n=0
∞∑
m=0
n+m∑
k=0
eiδ(k−n)µn+m√
n!m!k!(n +m− k)! |n〉A 〈k| ⊗ |m〉B 〈n+m− k| ,
(14)
where the global phases of Alice’s coherent state |α〉A = |eiθ
√
µ〉
A
and Bob’s |eiδα〉B = |ei(θ+δ)
√
µ〉
B
should be randomized and have a fixed phase difference δ. Therefore, we have
|α〉A |eiδα〉B
phase-randomized
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGA
one-photon
1√
2
(|01〉AB + e−iδ |10〉AB). (15)
For theX basis encoding, we have
|±α〉A |+α〉B
phase-randomized
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGA
one-photon
1√
2
(|01〉AB ± |10〉AB),
|±α〉A |−α〉B
phase-randomized
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGA
one-photon
1√
2
(|01〉AB ∓ |10〉AB),
ρ1XXTF =
1
2
(|01〉AB 〈01|+ |10〉AB 〈10|),
(16)
where the global phases of Alice’s and Bob’s coherent state should be equal and randomized.
It can be realized by using post-selected phase-matching method for phase-randomized coherent
state introduced in the original TF-QKD12 and phase-matching QKD15. If we consider the photon
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number space of TF state given that the global phases of Alice’s coherent state and Bob’s are
randomized and have a fixed phase difference, the density matrix can be given by
ρ = e−2µ
∞∑
n=0
(2µ)n
n!
|n〉TF 〈n| , (17)
which is similar with the phase encoding phase-randomized coherent state in the traditional decoy-
state QKD26, 27. Therefore, the decoy state method can be used for estimating the yield and QBER
of TF state with one-photon.
For phase-randomized coherent state used for Z basis encoding, we have
ρZZTF =(1− t)2 |00〉AB 〈00|+ t2
( ∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
|n〉A 〈n|
)( ∞∑
m=0
e−µ
µm
m!
|m〉B 〈m|
)
+ t(1− t)
[
|0〉A 〈0|
( ∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
|n〉B 〈n|
)
+
( ∞∑
n=0
e−µ
µn
n!
|n〉A 〈n|
)
|0〉B 〈0|
]
.
(18)
We need |0〉 as logic bit 0 and |1〉 as logic bit 1, therefore the efficient TF state with one-photon in
Z basis only results from the case of logic bit 0A1B and 1A0B with the probability 2t(1− t)µe−µ.
For simulation, we consider the case without Charlie’s disturbance. In the Z basis of practical
TF-QKD, by going through the quantum channel and beam splitter, we have (1 − t)2 probability
of quantum state
|0〉A |0〉B BS−→ |0〉L |0〉R , (19)
t(1− t) probability of quantum state
|0〉A |eiθB
√
µ〉B
BS−→
∣∣∣∣∣eiθB
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
L
∣∣∣∣∣−eiθB
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
R
, (20)
t(1− t) probability of quantum state
|eiθA√µ〉A |0〉B
BS−→
∣∣∣∣∣eiθA
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
L
∣∣∣∣∣eiθA
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
R
, (21)
and t2probability of quantum state
|eiθA√µ〉A |eiθB
√
µ〉B
BS−→
∣∣∣∣∣eiθA
√
µ
√
η
2
+ eiθB
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
L
∣∣∣∣∣eiθA
√
µ
√
η
2
− eiθB
√
µ
√
η
2
〉
R
. (22)
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Here, we have θA ∈ [0, 2pi) and θB ∈ [0, 2pi), L and R represent the left detector and right detector
of Charlie, respectively. The gain QZZ and QBER EZZ of practical TF-QKD can be given by
QZZ =2pd(1− pd)(1− t)2 + 4(1− pd)e−
µ
2
√
η[1− (1− pd)e−
µ
2
√
η]t(1− t)
+ 2(1− pd)e−µ
√
η[I0(µ
√
η)− (1− pd)e−µ
√
η]t2,
(23)
and
EZZQZZ =2pd(1− pd)(1− t)2 + 2(1− pd)e−µ
√
η[I0(µ
√
η)− (1− pd)e−µ
√
η]t2. (24)
For phase-encoding basis of practical TF-QKD, by going through the quantum channel and
beam splitter, we have 1/4 probability of quantum state
|ei(θA+pigA+pi2 hA)
√
λ〉A |ei(θB+pigB+
pi
2
hB)
√
χ〉B
BS−→
∣∣∣∣∣ei(θA+pigA+pi2 hA)
√
λ
√
η
2
+ ei(θB+pigB+
pi
2
hB)
√
χ
√
η
2
〉
L
⊗
∣∣∣∣∣ei(θA+pigA+pi2 hA)
√
λ
√
η
2
− ei(θB+pigB+pi2 hB)
√
χ
√
η
2
〉
R
,
(25)
where hA, hB ∈ {0, 1} represent basis X and Y , gA, gB ∈ {0, 1} represent logic bit 0 and 1 given
that the intensities of Alice’s and Bob’s are λ and χ, respectively, λ, χ ∈ {ν/2, ω/2, 0}. Here, we
define QθA,θB,λ,χhA,hB and E
θA,θB,λ,χ
hA,hB
are the gain and QBER that Alice and Bob choose basis hA and
hB when they send the global phase θA and θB optical pulses with intensities λ and χ, respectively.
Here,
QθA,θB,λ,χhA,hB =(1− pd)e−
λ+χ
2
√
η
[
e−
√
λχη cos x + e
√
λχη cos x
]
− 2(1− pd)2e−(λ+χ)
√
η, (26)
and
EθA,θB ,λ,χhA,hB Q
θA,θB ,λ,χ
hA,hB
= (1− pd)e−(
λ+χ
2
+
√
λχ cos x)
√
η − (1− pd)2e−(λ+χ)
√
η, (27)
where x = θB − θA + pi2 (hB − hA), EθA,θB,λ,λhA,hB ≃ 1−cos x2 when we assume
√
η → 0 and pd → 0.
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Obviously, we can directly estimate the yield Y 1ZZTF by using the data of phase-encoding basis
given that one of Alice and Bob sends intensity 0. We define λ ⊎ χ as the intensity set when Alice
and Bob send intensity λ and χ phase-randomized coherent state. Therefore, Q
ν
2 , Q
ν
2 and Q0 are
the gain when Alice and Bob send intensities set {0⊎ ν
2
, ν
2
⊎ 0}, {0⊎ ω
2
, ω
2
⊎ 0} and {0⊎ 0}, which
can be written as
Q
ν
2 =
1
2
(
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
Q
θA,θB ,0,
ν
2
hA,hB
dθAdθB +
1
4pi2
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
,0
hA,hB
dθAdθB
)
= 2(1− pd)e− ν4
√
η
[
1− (1− pd)e− ν4
√
η
]
,
Q
ω
2 = 2(1− pd)e−ω4
√
η
[
1− (1− pd)e−ω4
√
η
]
,
Q0 = 2pd(1− pd).
(28)
The Y 0ZZTF and Y
1ZZ
TF are the yields of TF state with vacuum and one-photon in the Z basis, respec-
tively, which can be given by (ν > ω > 0)26, 27
Y 0ZZTF = Y0 = Q
0 = 2pd(1− pd), (29)
and
Y 1ZZTF ≥ Y 1ZZLTF =
2ν
νω − ω2
(
e
ω
2Q
ω
2 − ω
2
ν2
e
ν
2Q
ν
2 − ν
2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
. (30)
We assume that the optical error rate eopt of X basis exists due to the single-photon interfer-
ence. For simplicity, we assume that the optical error rate is introduced by the phase misalignment12.
Here, a fixed phase difference between Alice’s and Bob’s global phase is δ0 = arccos(1 − 2eopt).
By using the post-selected phase-matching method in practical TF-QKD with BB84 encoding,
QνXX (Q
ω
XX) and E
ν
XX (E
ω
XX) are gain and QBER given that Alice choosesX basis with intensity
ν
2
(
ω
2
)
and Bob chooses X basis with intensity ν
2
(
ω
2
)
in the case of |kB − kA| = 0 and M2 . They
can be given by
QνXX =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM
δ0
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 dθAdθB, Q
ω
XX =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM
δ0
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ω
2
,ω
2
0,0 dθAdθB,
(31)
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and
EνXXQ
ν
XX =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM
δ0
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 Q
θA,θB ,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 dθAdθB,
QωXXQ
ω
XX =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM
δ0
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ω
2
,ω
2
0,0 Q
θA,θB,
ω
2
,ω
2
0,0 dθAdθB.
(32)
Due to the random phase shifting, there is still an intrinsic QBER because the random phases
are not perfectly matched. If eopt = 0.03, we have δ0 = 0.35 and E
ν
XX ∼ 3.6%. By using the
decoy-state mentod26, 27, the yield Y 1XXTF and QBER e
b1
XX can be given by
Y 1XXTF ≥ Y 1XXLTF =
ν
νω − ω2
(
eωQωXX −
ω2
ν2
eνQνXX −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
,
eb1XX ≤ eb1UXX =
eωEωXXQ
ω
XX − eb0Q0
ωY 1XXLTF
,
(33)
where eb0 = 1
2
is the QBER of TF state with vacuum in phase-encoding basis.
For six-state encoding28, the probability that both bit flip and phase shift occurs can be given
by38
a = (eb1ZZ + e
b1
XX − eb1Y Y )/2. (34)
To simplify, we assume that those cases of qubit preparation with relative phase modulation are
symmetrical since the random phase is unknown before Charlie performs single-photon BSM.
Therefore, we abtain a = eb1ZZ/2. Interestingly, the QBER e
b1
ZZ ≡ 0, which means that the key rate
of practical TF-QKD with six-state encoding has no advantage compared with BB84 encoding.
For the RFI scheme29, the Z basis is always well defined, which is ZA = ZB = Z for
Alice and Bob. The other two bases may vary with the slow phase shifting β, the relation can
be given by XB = cos βXA + sin βYA, YB = cos βYA − sin βYB and β = βB − βA, where
ZA and ZB , XA and XB , YA and YB are the location reference frames for Z, X and Y basis of
Alice and Bob, respectively. βA (βB) is the deviation between the practical and standard reference
frame for Alice (Bob). Therefore, the eigenstates of XA (XB) and YA (YB) can be written as
|±〉A = (|0〉 ± eiβA |1〉)/
√
2 (|±〉B = (|0〉 ± eiβB |1〉)/
√
2) and |±i〉A = (|0〉 ± ieiβA |1〉)/
√
2
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(|±i〉B = (|0〉± ieiβB |1〉)/
√
2). Note that βA and βB are the phases of intrinsic degree of freedom
between |0〉 and |1〉 and can vary slowly in the virtual protocol with RFI theory. The key rate of
single-photon with RFI theory is given by29
RRFI = 1−H(eb)− IE(C). (35)
Here, IE(C) = (1 − eb)H(1+µ2 ) + ebH(1+v2 ) quantifies the information of Eve’s knowledge, pa-
rameters v =
√
C/2− (1− eb)2u2/eb and u = min[
√
C/2/(1 − eb), 1]. We have IE(C) =
H((1 +
√
C/2)/2) if the QBER eb = 0. The value C can be defined as
C =〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2
=(1− 2EXX)2 + (1− 2EXY )2 + (1− 2EY X)2 + (1− 2EY Y )2,
(36)
which is independent of phase drifting βA (βB) and can just be used to bound Eve’s information.
However, the phase drifting will add the QBER of X basis, which will decrease the key rate
of BB84 encoding. Thereinto, EXX(Y Y,XY,Y X) is the QBER given that Alice and Bob choose
X −X(Y − Y,X − Y, Y −X) basis, which can be written as
EXX = EY Y =
1
2
(1− cos β),
EXY =
1
2
(1 + sin β), EY X =
1
2
(1− sin β).
(37)
One can acquire the maximum value C = 2 in the ideal case and IE(C = 2) = 0 if the phase
difference β is fixed. For phase change from β to β+∆β,∆β ∈ [0, 2pi] (uniformity variation), we
have
C =
2
(∆β)2
{
[sin(β +∆β)− sin β]2 + [cos(β +∆β)− cos β]2} = 4(1− cos∆β)
(∆β)2
. (38)
We can see that C is only related to phase change ∆β and is not related to phase difference β in
theory. The value C will decrease with ∆β increasing.
In the practical TF-QKD with RFI scheme, we define that QνXXk and E
ν
XXk are gain and
QBER when Alice chooses X basis with intensity ν
2
and Bob chooses X basis with intensity ν
2
in
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the case of set Dk by using the post-selected phase-matching method. Therefore, the gain Q
ν
XXk,
QνXY k, Q
ν
Y Xk and Q
ν
Y Y k of set Dk are
QνXXk =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 dθAdθB,
QνXY k =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,1 dθAdθB,
QνY Xk =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,0 dθAdθB,
QνY Y k =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,1 dθAdθB.
(39)
The QBER EνXXk, E
ν
XY k, E
ν
Y Xk and E
ν
Y Y k of set Dk can be written as
EνXXkQ
ν
XXk =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,0 dθAdθB,
EνXY kQ
ν
XY k =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,1 Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
0,1 dθAdθB,
EνY XkQ
ν
Y Xk =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,0 Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,0 dθAdθB,
EνY Y kQ
ν
Y Y k =
M2
4pi2
∫ δ0+ 2piM (k+1)
δ0+
2pi
M
k
∫ 2pi
M
0
E
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,1 Q
θA,θB,
ν
2
, ν
2
1,1 dθAdθB.
(40)
By using the decoy-state method, the lower and upper bounds of yield Y 1XXkTF , Y
1XY k
TF , Y
1Y Xk
TF and
Y 1Y Y kTF will be
Y 1XXkTF ≥ Y 1XXkLTF =
ν
νω − ω2
(
eωQωXXk −
ω2
ν2
eνQνXXk −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
,
Y 1XY kTF ≥ Y 1XY kLTF =
ν
νω − ω2
(
eωQωXY k −
ω2
ν2
eνQνXY k −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
,
Y 1Y XkTF ≥ Y 1Y XkLTF =
ν
νω − ω2
(
eωQωY Xk −
ω2
ν2
eνQνY Xk −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
,
Y 1Y Y kTF ≥ Y 1Y Y kLTF =
ν
νω − ω2
(
eωQωY Y k −
ω2
ν2
eνQνY Y k −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
Q0
)
,
(41)
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and
Y 1XXkTF ≤ Y 1XXkUTF =
eωQωXXk −Q0
ω
, Y 1XY kTF ≤ Y 1XY kUTF =
eωQωXY k −Q0
ω
,
Y 1Y XkTF ≤ Y 1Y XkUTF =
eωQωY Xk −Q0
ω
, Y 1Y Y kTF ≤ Y 1Y Y kUTF =
eωQωY Y k −Q0
ω
.
(42)
The lower and upper bounds of QBER eb1XXk, e
b1
XY k, e
b1
Y Xk and e
b1
Y Y k can be given by
eb1XXk ≥ eb1LXXk =
ν
(νω − ω2)Y 1XXkUTF
(
eωEωXXkQ
ω
XXk −
ω2
ν2
eνEνXXkQ
ν
XXk −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
eb0Q0
)
,
eb1XY k ≥ eb1LXY k =
ν
(νω − ω2)Y 1XY kUTF
(
eωEωXY kQ
ω
XY k −
ω2
ν2
eνEνXY kQ
ν
XY k −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
eb0Q0
)
,
eb1Y Xk ≥ eb1LY Xk =
ν
(νω − ω2)Y 1Y XkUTF
(
eωEωY XkQ
ω
Y Xk −
ω2
ν2
eνEνY XkQ
ν
Y Xk −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
eb0Q0
)
,
eb1Y Y k ≥ eb1LY Y k =
ν
(νω − ω2)Y 1Y Y kUTF
(
eωEωY Y kQ
ω
Y Y k −
ω2
ν2
eνEνY Y kQ
ν
Y Y k −
ν2 − ω2
ν2
eb0Q0
)
,
(43)
and
eb1XXk ≤ eb1UXXk =
eωEωXXkQ
ω
XXk − eb0Q0
ωY 1XXkLTF
, eb1XY k ≤ eb1UXY k =
eωEωXY kQ
ω
XY k − eb0Q0
ωY 1XY kLTF
,
eb1Y Xk ≤ eb1UY Xk =
eωEωY XkQ
ω
Y Xk − eb0Q0
ωY 1Y XkLTF
, eb1Y Y k ≤ eb1UY Y k =
eωEωY Y kQ
ω
Y Y k − eb0Q0
ωY 1Y Y kLTF
.
(44)
For the practical TF-QKD with RFI scheme, we need to calculate the minimum value of C1k .
Therefore, for the value
C1k = (1− 2eb1XXk)2 + (1− 2eb1XY k)2 + (1− 2eb1Y Xk)2 + (1− 2eb1Y Y k)2, (45)
we have
eb1XXk =


eb1UXXk, e
b1U
XXk ≤ 12 ,
eb1LXXk, e
b1L
XXk ≥ 12 ,
1
2
, eb1LXXk ≤ 12 ≤ eb1UXXk,
(46)
the parameters eb1XY k, e
b1
Y Xk and e
b1
Y Y k are similar with the case of e
b1
XXk.
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Figure 1: Scheme to overcome the PLOB bound of QKD. (a) Setup for entanglement-based MDI-
QKD with single-photon BSM. Alice and Bob prepare single-photon Bell state, while Charlie
implements entanglement swapping. M represents the measurement operation, such as Z, X
and Y basis. Alice and Bob implement theM measurement operation after Charlie performs the
single-photon BSM. (b) Prepare-and-measure MDI-QKD with single-photon BSM. Alice and Bob
directly prepare the qubit with superpositions of the vacuum and one-photon states. Alice and Bob
implement the M measurement operation before Charlie performs the single-photon BSM. (c)
Effective TF-QKD with single-photon and laser sources. The photons from single-photon source
and laser source are indistinguishable in every degree of freedom. The phase-reference of long-
distance should be stabilized to implement laser interference. The single-photon source is used to
implement Z basis encoding, while the laser source is used to implement the phase encoding, such
as X and Y basis. 26
Figure 2: The practical TF-QKD setup. (a) practical TF-QKD with independent lasers. The phase
modulator (PM) can realize phase encoding and random phase modulation at one time. CW-Laser:
continuous-wave laser, AM: amplitude modulator, VOA, variable optical attenuator, BPF: band
pass filter, PC: polarization controller, BS: beam splitter, RNG: random number generator. (b)
Phase self-aligned TF-QKD with single laser. The Faraday mirror (FM) or the polarization beam
splitter (PBS) and the pi/2 Faraday rotator (FR) are exploited to realize the transformation between
horizontal and vertical polarizations. Alice and Bob could choose to prepare the qubit in Z basis
by using Charlie’s laser or their own pulse lasers. The security will be enhanced if they use their
own laser. Some polarization-maintaining fiber are required to keep the polarization in the systems
of Alice, Bob and Charlie. P-Laser: pulse laser, OS: optical switch, PD, photoelectric detector,
Cir: circulator.
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Figure 3: The key rate of practical TF-QKD with BB84 encoding in the asymptotic limit. For each
transmission loss, we optimize the parameters µ and t with eopt = 1%, ν = 0.1, ω = 0.02 and
M = 16. For the PLOB bound, we use RPLOB = − log2(1 − ηPLOB), ηPLOB = ηd × 10−0.02L. The
secure key rate of TF-QKD with BB84 encoding can surpass the PLOB bound under the case of
detector with ηd = 40%, pd = 10
−7, the performance of detector has been realized much more34.
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Figure 4: The key rates of practical TF-QKD with BB84 encoding and RFI scheme in the asymp-
totic limit. For each transmission loss, we optimize the parameters µ and t with ηd = 90%,
pd = 10
−9, ν = 0.1, ω = 0.02 and M = 16. The secure key rate of practical TF-QKD with
RFI scheme do not change obviously with optical error rate eopt. The secure key rate of practical
TF-QKD with BB84 encoding can also beat the PLOB bound even the optical error rate up to
eopt = 20%.
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